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Abstract  The paper explains response particles like yes and no as anaphoric ele-
ments that pick up propositional discourse referents that are introduced by pre-
ceding  sentences.  It  is  argued  that  negated  antecedent  clauses  introduce  two
propositional discourse referents, which results in ambiguities of answers that are
partly  resolved by pragmatic  optimization.  The paper  also  discusses  response
particles like okay, right, uh-huh, uh-uh, and German ja, nein and doch.
Keywords: response particles, polarity particles, discourse referents
For example, the single words “yes” or “no,” when coming at the end 
of a protracted discussion, may have an extraordinarily great signifi-
cance.    Transmission of Information, R.V.L. Hartley, 1928.
 1 Introduction
There is a – perhaps naïve – conviction that response particles, also called polarity
particles, like  yes and  no are particularly simple and straightforward, as the fol-
lowing quote from the gospel of St. Matthew (King James translation) shows.
(1) But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay;
for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil. (Matthew 5:37)
To think of  yes  and  no as simple  may be  reasonable for responses to assertions
and questions as in (2). But things get  messy with responses to antecedents that
contain a negation as in (3), where different continuations with elliptical clauses
are possible. 
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(2) a. A: You stole the cookie. B: Yes. (= B did steal the cookie)
b. A: Did you steal the cookie?  No. (= B didn’t steal the cookie)
(3) a. A: You did not steal the cookie. B: Yes. B: Yes, I didn’t. / Yes, I did.
b. A: Did you not steal the cookie? No. No, I didn’t. / No, I did.
I will present a theory that maintains that the semantics of response particles is
simple; however, complications arise due to the negation in the antecedent clause.
 2 Recent approaches to response particles
The semantics and pragmatics of response particles have been a topic of research
interest for a number of years. Here, I will discuss two recent approaches, Kramer
& Rawlins 2009 and Farkas & Roelofsen (ms.) 2012. 
 2.1 Kramer & Rawlins 2009
Kramer & Rawlins analyze yes and no as adverbials corresponding to the heads of
ellipsis clauses of category ΣP (the “prejacent”), which in turn correspond to con-
textually salient propositions. Contextually recoverable parts can be deleted. 
(4) A: Ede stole the cookie.
B: [ΣP Yes [ΣP Σ [TP he did [ the steal the cookie///////////////////////]]]]
The response particle no has an uninterpretable feature [u NEG] that agrees with
the head Σ of the elliptical clause, which corresponds to the interpretable negation
within the elliptical clause. Being uninterpretable, this feature does not result in a
double negation reading in (5) (cf. Zeijlstra 2004).
(5) A: Ede did not steal the cookie.
B: [ΣP No[u NEG] [ΣP Σ[u NEG] [TP he didn’t[i NEG] [ the steal the cookies/////////////////////////]]]]
In contrast, the response particle yes is featureless, allowing for the following use
in addition to the one mentioned in (4):
(6) A: Ede did not steal the cookie.
B: [ΣP Yes [ΣP Σ[u NEG] [TP he didn’t[i NEG] [ the steal the cookies/////////////////////////]]]]
One problem of this account is that it predicts the answer (7) to be possible. An-
other problem is that the distribution of elliptical clauses with and without re-
sponse particles is different in embedded contexts, as in (8):  
(7) A: Ede stole the cookie. B: #Yes, he didn’t steal the cookie///////////////////////.
(8) Did Ede steal the cookies? a. If he did, he must pay them back. 
 b. *If yes, he did, he must pay them back. 
 c. If  ??yes / so, he must pay them back. 
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 2.2 Semantic approach: Farkas & Roelofsen 2012
Farkas & Roelofsen 2012 couch their theory within inquisitive semantics and the
theory of communication in Farkas & Bruce 2010. Glossing over details, asser-
tions makes salient one proposition, cf. (9), whereas polarity questions introduce
two propositions, one the negation of the other, as in Hamblin semantics, cf. (10).
(9) a. Ede stole the cookies. {φ} 
b. Ede did not steal the cookies. {¬φ}
(10) a. Did Ede steal the cookies? {φ, ¬φ}
b. Did Ede not steal the cookies? {φ, ¬φ}
It is assumed that one of the propositions is highlighted (here represented by bold-
face); this is the proposition mentioned by the sentence, which provides the target
of the response particles. The response particles have the following semantics:
(11) a. yes: confirms highlighted proposition; 
 reverses (= negates) highlighted negative propositions.
b. no: confirms highlighted negative proposition;
reverses (= negates) highlighted propositions.
This predicts the answer patterns in (2) and (3). However, notice that (11) requires
two devices extraneous to the truth-conditional semantics of questions: the high-
lighting of propositions, and their identification as negated (as suggested in Situa-
tion Semantics, cf. Ginzburg & Sag 2000,  Cooper & Ginzburg 2011).  Farkas &
Roelofson 2012 are aware of this deficiency of purely truth-conditional represen-
tations,  and  suggest  in  passing  the  use  of  propositional  discourse  referents
marked for negation; this will be a crucial feature of the account presented here.  
(11) is  just  a  preliminary  generalization.  In  their  official  theory,  Farkas  &
Roelofson assume just like Kramer & Rawlins 2009 that the anaphoric link to the
antecedent clause is provided by a prejacent clause, cf. (12). 
(12) [Antecedent clause] ... [PolP [Pol yes/no] [CP Prejacent]]
Furthermore, the two particles are analyzed as a disjunctive feature combination:
(13) a. Absolute Polarity: [+]/[–], prejacent non-negated / negated
b. Relative Polarity: [SAME]/[REVERSE], polarity of prejacent same / reverse
(14) a. yes realizes [SAME] or [+]
b. no realizes [REVERSE] or [–]
This explains the answering patterns in (3) as in (15) and (16):
(15) A: Did Ede steal the cookies?
B: a. [PolP yes[SAME] or [+] [CP he did.]] b. [PolP no[REVERSE] or [–] [CP he didn’t.]]
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(16) A: Did Ede not steal the cookies?
B: a. [PolP yes[SAME] [CP he didn’t.]] b. [PolP yes[+] [CP he did.]]
 c. [PolP no[REVERSE] [CP he did.]] d. [PolP no[–] [CP he didn’t.]]
Farkas & Roelofsen apply their feature system to response particles in other lan-
guages, such as French si and German doch as [REVERSE, +] particles and Roma-
nian ba as a particle marking [REVERSE] in combination with other particles.
This theory avoids problem (7) due to the formulation of the conditions where
yes can be used. It can also circumvent problem (8) by concentrating on yes and
no in their response function only. But to my mind, the characterization of yes and
no by disjunctive features in (14) is fairly complex. In the theory proposed in the
following, suggestions by Farkas & Roelofson that response particles are anapho-
ric expressions are worked out in greater detail, and the complexity that  we ob-
serve in the use of these particles will be explained as resulting from indepen-
dently motivated complexities in the way their antecedents are introduced. 
 3 Response particles as anaphora
 3.1 Propositional discourse referents
In the theory proposed here, response particles are not related to a prejacent clause
that is anaphoric to an antecedent clause, but they are anaphors themselves. That
is, they pick up discourse referents that are anchored to salient propositions. Such
propositional discourse referents have been assumed by a number of authors, e.g.
by Asher 1986, Cornish 1992, Geurts 1998 and Frank 1996. For example, propo-
sitions can be taken up by pronouns, as in (17):
(17) [ Ede stole the cookie]. Bill knows [it]. 
↪ dprop ↑d ↪: introduction, ↑: uptake
The first clause introduces a propositional discourse referent d that is anchored to
the proposition ‘Ede stole the cookie’. It is picked up by the pronoun it and inter-
preted as the argument of the propositional attitude verb know. 
Clauses can also introduce other kinds of discourse referents, in particular dis-
course referents anchored to events, as in (18), or to speech acts, as in (19).
(18) Ede stole the cookie. Bill saw it.
(19) A: Ede stole the cookie. B: That’s a lie!
I propose that the three types of clausal discourse referents are introduced by three
distinct  layers  in the clause.  Events are  introduced by the vP,  semantically an
event predicate,  like λe[e is an event of Ede stealing the cookie]. Propositions
claim that an event exists in a temporal or modal relation to a world-time index,
like λi∃e[e is an event in the world of i preceding the time of i, and e is an event
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of Ede stealing the cookie]; this corresponds to the syntactic category TP. In a
speech act like an assertion, a speaker takes  on responsibility for the truth of a
proposition; this change of commitments of a speaker corresponds to a change of
the world (cf. Szabolcsi 1982). This change is an event as well. I assume that this
corresponds to a distinct layer in syntax, which I call ActP. (20) and (21) illustrate
this with an assertion and a polarity question.2 
(20) [ActP ASSERT [TP Ede steal-PAST [vP tEde tsteal the cookie]]]
↪ dspeech act      ↪ d′prop              ↪ d″event
(21) [ActP  did-QUEST [TP Ede tdid-PAST [vP tEde steal the cookie]]]
↪ dspeech act    ↪ d′prop    ↪ d″event
Negation creates a propositional syntactic category, which I will call NegP.3  This
also introduces a propositional discourse referent, which is anchored to the propo-
sition λi¬∃e[e is an event in the world of i and before the time of i, and e is an
event of Ede stealing the cookie]. 
(22) [ActP ASSERT [NegP Ede did-n’t [TP tEde tdid [vP tEde tsteal steal the cookie]]
↪dspeech act ↪d′prop   ↪d″prop    ↪d‴event
Negation  blocks  discourse  referents  that  are existentially  bound in  its  scope;
hence the event discourse referent d‴ is not accessible, and continuations like Bill
saw it are not possible. But the discourse referent d″ remains accessible even un-
der negation, as it is not existentially bound. Evidence for the accessibility of two
propositional discourse referents after negation comes from cases like (23a,b):
(23) Two plus two isn’t five.  a. Everyone knows that.
[NegP 2+2 is-n’t [TP t2+2 tis 5]]     ↑d′¬[2+2=5]
↪d′¬[2+2=5]               ↪d[2+2=5] b. That would be a contradiction.
 ↑d[2+2=5]
The first clause introduces two propositional discourse referents, d for the propo-
sition  2+2=5,  and  d′  for  its  negation,  ¬[2+2=5].  (23a)  obviously  picks  up  d′,
whereas (b) picks up d. Example (24) makes the same point with the pronoun it. 
(24) Ede didn’t steal the cookie, a. and he actually can prove it.
b. even though people believed it. 
It is worthwhile to notice that the introduction of a propositional discourse ref-
erent for the non-negated proposition depends on the presence of a syntactic cate-
2 The examples do not represent a movement of Ede to SpecActP and of steal-PAST to Act0.
3 It is often assumed that NegP is a category under TP, following Pollock 1989. The main argu-
ment is that  NPIs do not occur in subject position.  However,  negation clearly scopes over
tense;  Ede didn’t steal the cookie says that within the reference time, there was no stealing
event, not that there was an event that was not a stealing. 
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gory expressing negation. This is lacking in (25), and reference to the non-negated
proposition becomes much harder.
(25) Two plus two is unequal to five. a. Everyone knows that.
[TP 2+2 is unequal 5] b. #That would be a contradiction.
↪d[2+2≠5]
Example (26) makes the same point. While the first clause in (b) entails that the
Incas did not reach Tahiti, this proposition does not result in a discourse referent.
(26) a. The Incas didn’t reach Tahiti, even though Heyerdahl claimed this.
b. #The Incas missed Tahiti, even though Heyerdahl claimed this.
Negative quantifiers behave like sentential negation,  introducing a non-negated
proposition. In (27), this refers to ‘someone has deciphered Rongorongo’.
(27) Nobody has ever deciphered Rongorongo, the writing of Easter Island, 
even though this has sometimes been claimed.
The examples given here show that we have to assume discourse referents for
sentential objects,  to explain the interpretation of anaphoric pronouns like it  and
that.  Now, what are the semantic objects that these discourse referents are an-
chored to? A minimal view is that they are anchored to propositions that just cap-
ture the truth value of clauses, as in Heim 1992. A maximal view is that they stand
for full-fledged representational objects,  as in Asher 1986. An intermediate view
is that they consist of propositions plus a sequence of discourse referents, the ones
that are introduced by the clause that expresses that proposition, as in Frank 1996
and Geurts 1998. This representation is necessary, as pronouns referring to propo-
sitional discourse referents can make accessible the discourse referents introduced
by indefinite expressions in their scope, as in the following example:
(28) Ede probably didn’t buy a car. And if this were true, he would have sold it.  
We assume that propositional discourse referents that are introduced by a NegP
receive a  formal  feature [neg]. This is a feature  similar to gender in gender lan-
guages. E.g. in German, a discourse referent introduced by eine Gabel ‘a fork’ has
to be marked as [feminine], and is picked up by an agreeing pronoun,  sie.  In a
similar way, as suggested by Farkas & Roelofson 2012, discourse referents intro-
duced by negated clauses are formally marked as negative, as in (29); this will de-
termine the range of particles that can pick up such discourse referents, e.g. the
German particle doch; see below.
(29) [NegP Ede did-n’t [TP tEde tdid steal the cookie]]
↪ d′prop[neg]           ↪dprop
Before we turn to the choice of particles we will have a closer look at the pronom-
inal expressions that pick up propositional discourse referents. 
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 3.2 Propositional anaphora: DPs, TPs and ActPs
We have seen examples of pronouns and demonstratives like it, this and that that
are able to take up propositional discourse referents. In addition to these anapho-
ric expressions of category DP, there are anaphoric expressions that appear to be
of category TP, namely so and not (pace Cornish 1992, who considers so in this
function an adverbial). For example, they occur in if clauses and as complements
of propositional attitude verbs like believe, where a category TP is expected:
(30) a. Did Ede steal a cookie? If {he stole one / so /*this}, he must give it back.
b. Did Ede steal a cookie? Bill believes {he stole one / so / this}.
The verb believe also allows for a DP complement, cf. believe the rumor that…,
and so we also find propositional DP anaphors like this in that position. 
I would like to propose that yes and no are also anaphors that pick up proposi-
tional discourse referents; this corresponds to Ginzburg & Sag 2000, who call
them “propositional  lexemes” (however,  they analyze these  particles  as  adver-
bials). In contrast to so, yes and no are of the type ActP. In particular, I assume the
following: 
(31) a. yes picks up salient propDR d and asserts it: ASSERT(d)
b. no picks up salient propDR d and asserts its negation: ASSERT(¬d)
We cannot assume that yes and no simply pick up a propositional discourse refer-
ent d because they do not easily fit into syntactic slots reserved for TPs:
(32) a. Did Ede steal a cookie? If  ??yes, he must give it back. 
b. Did Ede steal a cookie? Bill believes ??yes. 
Interestingly, this is different for the particles ja and nein in German, which occur
freely in such contexts, and hence have to be analyzed as TPs:
(33) a. Hat Ede einen Keks gestohlen? Wenn ja, muss er ihn zurückgeben.
b. Hat Ede einen Keks gestohlen? Bill glaubt, ja / nein.
Hence we have to assume that the particles  ja and  nein pick up a propositional
discourse referent, which then can be asserted. For English yes and no, the asser-
tion is already part of the meaning itself:
(34) a. English: ⟦[ActP yes]⟧ = ASSERT(d)
b. German: ⟦[ActP ASSERT [TP ja]]⟧ = ASSERT([TP ja]) = ASSERT(d). 
As a consequence, the notion “response particle” makes sense for English yes and
no, but not necessarily for German. In German, the particles  ja  and nein can be
used for responses, as in (34)(b), but they don’t have to, as in (33).
In contrast to Kramer & Rawlins 2009 and Farkas & Roelofsen 2012, I do not
assume that yes and no form expressions that stand in construction with prejacent
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clauses. Structures like yes, he did or no, he didn’t rather are analyzed as apposi-
tives, consisting of two parallel speech acts. In  (35) the answer yes  (a), the an-
swer he did (b) and the complex answer yes, he did (c) are given for illustration. 
(35) A: [ActP  did-QUEST [TP Ede tdid-PAST [vP tEde tsteal the cookie]]]
    ↪ dprop                 ↪ d′event 
B: a. [ActP yes], = ASSERT(d)
↑dprop
 b. [ActP ASSERT [TP he did [[vP the steal the cookie] / [DP it]]]]
   ↑d′event    ↑d′event
 c. [ActP yes], [ActP ASSERT [TP he did [[vP the steal the cookies] / [DP it]]]]
 ↑dprop               ↑d′event  ↑d′event
The  categorial  difference  between  English  and  German  response  particles
leads to a minimal contrast that should be mentioned here:
(36) A: Does Ede steal cookies?
B: a. [ActP yes], [ActP ASSERT [TP sometimes [TP he does]]]
b. ??Sometimes [ActP yes]]
(37) A: Stiehlt Ede Kekse?
B: a. [ActP ASSERT [TP ja]], [ForcePASSERT [TP manchmal [TP stiehlt er sie]]]
b. [ActP ASSERT [TP  manchmal [TP ja]]]
The response  sometimes yes is hardly acceptable, in contrast to  yes, sometimes.
This can be derived from the fact that the quantifier  sometimes  does not easily
scope  out  of  the  speech  act  (except  in  a  reading  difficult  to  obtain,  meaning
‘sometimes the answer is yes’). In contrast, German allows for both options, in
particular  for  manchmal ja.  This  is  predicted if  ja is  a  propositional  TP,  over
which the quantifier sometimes can scope (with the meaning: the proposition ‘Ede
steals cookies’ is true at some indices).
The idea that response particles take up propositional functions may be seen
as problematic in what Servidio 2012 calls “polarity fragments”, in Italian:
(38) A: Chi di voi ha cenato? B: Gianni sì. / Gianni no.
 ‘Who among you has eaten?’ ‘Gianni yes.’ / ‘Gianni no.’
Answers like Gianni sì can be construed as evidence for the deletion approach of
Kramer & Rawlins, where sì would be the remnant of sì, ha cenato ‘yes, s/he ate’.
For the anaphoric theory, we can assume that the question introduces a proposi-
tional discourse referent for each felicitous answer. Alternatively,  sì and  no can
pick up the background of the question (cf. Krifka 2001), λx[x has eaten], and ap-
ply it to the topic, e.g. Gianni. Polarity fragment answers also occur as partial an-
swers to questions like  Gli bambini hanno già cenato? ‘Did the children eat al-
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ready?’; here the response particle may take up the proposition ‘the children have
eaten’, which is restricted by the free topic, Gianni. 
 3.3 Other ways of responding
The focus of this article is on the response particles yes and no, but it should be
noted that there are other ways of responding to an assertion. Here, I will give a
quick overview of how some prominent ways to respond can be dealt with. 
One option is to use modal adverbials like maybe. I assume that they are rem-
nants of elliptical clauses, as illustrated in (39). 
(39) B: [ActP ASSERT [TP maybe [TP he stole the cookie]]]
    ↑dprop
Responses like yes maybe appear to be degraded, as if the speaker would weaken
an assertion previously made. This can be explained if yes already consists of an
unmodified assertion,  cf. (40) – the first part asserts d, the second ⃟d.  Inciden-
tally, this is additional evidence against the analysis of Kramer & Rawlins 2009.
(40) #[ActP yes] [ActP ASSERT [TP maybe [TP he stole the cookie]]]
However, answers like  maybe yes, maybe no, and their combination maybe
yes maybe no, are well attested. Presumably maybe can act as an operator on the
speech act level, similar to adverbials like frankly.  With it, the speaker qualifies
the assertion, roughly “The right answer could be yes”. This signals that there are
reasons to give this answer,  but perhaps not compelling ones. The analysis of
maybe as an evidential that is interpreted above the speech act level, as illustrated
in (41), should also be available as an alternative for (40).
(41) [ActP maybe [ActP yes]]
Answers like (42) are pragmatically incoherent because the first assertion is atten-
uated, while the other one is unqualified.  Just as  (40), this  is not predicted by
Kramer & Rawlins 2009.
(42) #[ActP maybe [ActP yes]] [ActP ASSERT [TP he did steal the cookie]]
In German, response particles may be combined with  aber  ‘but’, as in  aber
ja/nein/doch, which is expected if the adversative conjunction aber applies to TPs
or to ActPs (English equivalents roughly are  oh yes/no, with an interjection  oh
that is outside the ActP). Aber expresses some contrast to the targeted speech act.
This allows the use of aber in responses to assertions (43)(a,b), and biased ques-
tions, (d,e), but disfavors it for non-biased questions, cf. (c). 
(43) a. A: Ede hat Kekse gestohlen. B: Aber nein. / #Aber ja.
b. A: Ede hat keine Kekse gestohlen. B: # Aber nein. / Aber ja/doch.
c. A: Hat Ede Kekse gestohlen? B: (?)Aber nein. / ?Aber ja.
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d. A: Hat denn Ede Kekse gestohlen? B: ?Aber nein. / Aber ja.
e. A: Hat Ede nicht Kekse gestohlen? B: Aber nein. / ?Aber ja.
The effects are fairly subtle, especially for (c), as the antecedent question can eas-
ily be shifted to a biased reading, and then aber is fine. The adversative particle
expresses a connotation like: How could you even think of this (the biased) possi-
bility! The results are reminiscent to the more robust effects of the Romanian par-
ticle ba, analyzed in Farkas 2010 as involving prejacent propositions. 
Another speechact related response option is by right and wrong. These parti-
cles arguably do not take up a propositional discourse referent, but rather the dis-
course referent introduced by  a speech act, and evaluate it as  being  justified or
not.  The evaluation as  right states that  the speech act was justified, e.g. that  the
speaker would also commit to the asserted proposition. Consequently, right (and
wrong) only allow for one reading for antecedent sentences that are negated, as in
(44),  which proposes two distinct analyses for  right as remnant of an elliptical
clause or as a response particle with the same overall meaning.
(44) A: [ActP ASSERT  [NegP Ede did-n’t [tEde tsteal steal the cookie]]]
↪dspeechact
B: a. [ActP ASSERT [this is right / wrong]]
        ↑d
b. [ActP Right.], making the same speech act as d, performed by B.
Naturally,  right and wrong are awkward with non-biased questions;  all that they
could mean in this context is that the act of posing the questions was justified or
not. With biased questions, right and wrong apply to the assertion of the proposi-
tion that the question is biased to. We can understand this in such a way that the
speaker of a biased question, like the declarative question Ede stole a cookie?, in-
fluences  the addressee  to make  the corresponding assertion, here  Ede stole the
cookie. The response  right then expresses that this attempt is justified, which is
tantamount to saying that the addressee actually would make this assertion. 
Yet another type of response is by okay (according to the OED, first recorded
mention in 1839 as an acronym of all known). Just like right, it cannot answer a
non-biased question, and hence should react to the speech act rather than to the
proposition of an antecedent clause. As a consequence, just as right, it never tar-
gets the inner proposition in a negated sentence. But it does not commit the utterer
to the proposition expressed by the speech act itself (Farkas, pers. comm.). With
okay, speaker B just indicates compliance with what speaker A wants, namely that
the proposition becomes part of the common ground. 
This meaning of okay can be captured if we assume that an assertion consists
of two separate operations (cf. also Krifka, to app.): first, a conversational move
in which the speaker commits to the truth of the proposition, and second, one in
which the speaker intends to make the proposition part of the common ground.
These two moves would introduce distinct discourse referents. This is illustrated
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in (45), where the ASSERT operator is expressed by the conjunction of two sim-
pler moves, CM for the event of creating A’s commitment to the proposition ‘Ede
stole the cookie’, and CG for the event of A’s attempt to make this proposition
part of the current common ground of A and B (“putting the proposition on the ta-
ble”, in the terminology of Farkas & Bruce 2010). 
(45) A: [ActP CM & CG [TP Ede stole [vP tEde tsteal the cookie]]]
        ↪dsa   ↪d′sa ↪d″prop  ↪d‴event
B: a. [ActP Right.], making the same speech act as d + d′, performed by B.
b. [ActP Okay.], expressing compliance to the speech act d′.
The compliance meaning of okay also explains the use of okay as a reaction to im-
peratives, in which the speaker performs a speech act that restricts the future op-
tion space of the addressee (e.g. A: Open the window! B: Okay.). 
It appears that yes can also be used to indicate compliance to the act CG. This
would explain the use of yes (and no) as reactions to imperatives. It could also ex-
plain an observation by Paul Portner (pers. comm.) that yes, while fine as a reac-
tion to a question, is slightly dispreferred over yes plus an elliptical clause as a re-
action to an assertion:
(46) a. A: Ede stole the cookie. B: ?Yes. / Yes, he did.
b. A: Did Ede steal the cookie? B:  Yes. / Yes, he did.
The idea is that with antecedent assertions, a yes answer could, in principle, just
express compliance, similar to  okay. If the speaker intends the stronger reading
that he himself is committed towards the proposition, then the more specific an-
swer yes he did is preferred. The compliance reading of yes, and the non-compli-
ance reading of no, can be derived as follows: Assume that the operator CG ex-
presses that  a proposition, here ‘Ede stole the cookie’,  is  part  of the common
ground. The discourse referent d′ in (45) then would be propositional, and yes and
no could be understood just as in (31): yes asserts that the proposition ‘Ede stole
the cookie’ indeed is in the common ground; notice that this does not commit
speaker B to the truth of this proposition. And no would assert that it is not; again,
B would not be committed to the truth of the negation of the proposition; B could
just express that there aren’t sufficient reasons to assume B. This use of no could
also explain the no of surprise, as in No!, equivalent to That’s not true! that, with-
out really challenging the authority of the speaker, expresses an unwillingness to
accept a proposition into the common ground without further elaboration.
There are also paralinguistic ways of responses, that is, ways that do not cor-
respond to the standard phonology of English (cf. Ward 2006). There is what the
OED literalizes as uh-huh, often with raising tone pattern, and as uh-uh, with glot-
tal stops and downstep tone pattern. In contrast to okay, uh-huh can be used as an
answer to a polarity question, just as uh-uh, cf. (47). 
(47) A: Did Ede steal the cookie? B: Uh-huh. / Uh-uh. / *Okay.
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The use of uh-huh and uh-uh as reactions to questions shows that these responses
can commit the utterer to a proposition. This is also evident for uh-uh as a nega-
tive response to an assertion, as in (48):
(48) A: Ede stole the cookie. B: Uh-uh. (equivalent to no, he didn’t).
The status of  uh-huh as a response to an assertion  appears to be ambiguous be-
tween compliance reading, like okay, and the committing reading as in (47). How-
ever, just as the simple yes,  cf.  (46a),  the committing interpretation of uh-huh is
somewhat marginal in  this case,  and eclipsed by the complying interpretation,
perhaps even more so than yes. 
We can summarize these observations by the hypothesis that uh-huh and uh-
uh mean the same as yes and no. However, the syntactic categories are clearly dis-
tinct; responses like uh-huh, he did or uh-uh, he didn’t are rather unusual.  These
paralinguistic response particles also cannot occur in embedded positions in Ger-
man, as in conditional clauses or as complements of propositional attitude verbs,
different from ja  and  nein,  cf.  wenn ja, but *wenn uh-uh. The relation between
these paralinguistic signals to yes and no are similar to huh? vs. what? in requests
for repeating a prior utterance. 
In concluding this section, it should be pointed out that in addition to verbal
responses, there are also non-verbal ones, e.g. the head nod for agreeing answers
and the head shake for non-agreeing answers in Western European cultures.  In
general, the range of such reactions to different kinds of speech acts is a field still
largely unexplored in formal semantics and pragmatics. 
 4 Optimal Choice of Polarity Particles
In the preceding section I have proposed that response particles, in particular yes
and no, pick up propositional discourse referents and assert them, or assert their
negation. In this section we will consider the optimal choice of such particles, in
particular with negated antecedent clauses. 
 4.1 Yes and no as responses to negated propositions
Recall the analysis of assertions of negated clauses. In (49), only the propositional
discourse referents introduced by the TP and the NegP are indicated. 
(49) [ActP ASSERT [NegP Ede did-n’t [TP tEde tdid steal the cookie]]]
↪dprop         ↪d′prop
The response particles yes and no can pick up either discourse referent, d′ or d, re-
sulting in four possible analyses. As we have seen before, some of these interpre-
tations require an additional elliptical clause or a particular rejecting accent. 
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(50) a. Yes. ASSERT(d′) ‘Yes, he did!’ Rejecting accent, with clause.
b. Yes. ASSERT(d) ‘Yes, he didn’t.’ Natural, but with clause.
c. No. ASSERT(¬d′) ‘No (he didn’t).’ Natural, clause not necessary.
d. No. ASSERT(¬d) ‘No, he did!’ Rejecting accent, with clause.
How can we explain these preferences? I suggest that there are two pragmatic
markedness principles that are operative which jointly generate the observed pat-
tern. First, disagreement with the first speaker must be marked; this explains the
rejecting accent pattern and the strong tendency to use the response particles to-
gether with an elliptical clause. Second, the two propositional discourse referents
differ in their salience. One would perhaps be inclined to think that the NegP ref-
erent, d, is more salient than the TP discourse referent, d′, as the latter is intro-
duced within the scope of the expression that introduces d. However, in typical
cases in which a negated clause is asserted, the non-negated proposition will al-
ready be salient in the context. For example, it is hard to imagine that a sentence
like Ede didn’t steal the cookie could be uttered in a context in which the proposi-
tion ‘Ede stole the cookie’ is not salient already,  e.g. as a possible explanation
why the cookie is lacking. Hence we can assume the following two constraints:
(51) a. *NEGDR: Penalizes picking up a negatively marked discourse referent.
b. *DISAGR: Penalizes disagreement with the other speaker.
The competition between the two constraints can be visualized in an OT tableau.
We can plausibly assume that violations of *DISAGR are ranked higher than viola-
tions of *NEGDR. 
(52) Calculation of optimal forms in an OT tableau, antecedent: assertion (49).
expression reference resulting meaning *DISAGR *NEGDR Favorite
a yes d′ ‘He did.’ * ((☜))
b yes d ‘He didn’t.’ * (☜)
c no d′ ‘He didn’t.’ ☜
d no d ‘He did.’ * *
The optimal candidate is no in (c). This predicts that the simple response particle
no will have this reading. Hence if no should express reading (d), it must be speci-
fied with an elliptical clause. For yes, we have a ranking-dependent preference for
(b) over (a). This predicts that yes will be preferably used with the same interpre-
tation as  no. But as the two interpretations in (a) and (b) differ only slightly, a
clarifying elliptical clause is usually required to express these meanings. 
What about yes and no as responses to questions with propositional negations?
Such questions also introduce two discourse referents:
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(53) [ActP did QUEST [NegP Ede not [TP tEde steal the cookie]]]?
  ↪dprop    ↪d′prop
The reactions are similar as to negated assertions, except that yes is more naturally
interpreted as ‘he did’ (cf. Holmberg 2012). This would follow from the plausible
assumption that questions based on negated propositions do express a bias, but a
weaker one than assertions. Hence the constraint *DISAGR is ranked lower, leading
to a preference for line (a) over line (b) in diagram (52). 
The preference for the non-negated discourse referent d′ was motivated by the
fact that negated antecedent clauses typically occur in contexts in which the non-
negated proposition is salient. In contexts in which this condition is not satisfied,
we should expect the answer patterns to be different. This is indeed the case:
(54) B: Which of the mountains on this list did Reinhold Messner not climb?
A: Well, let’s see... He did not climb Mount Cotopaxi in Ecuador.
B: Yes. (= he didn’t climb it) / No. (= he climbed it) 
Here the negated discourse referent d now is more salient.  When we assume in-
stead of  *NEGDR a constraint *NONSAL which penalizes reference to less-salient
discourse referents, this would result in yes meaning ‘he didn’t’ as the most opti-
mal answer. Polarity questions containing a focus as in (55) make the same point:4
(55) A: Did BILL not brush his teeth? B: Yes. (= he didn’t) / No. (= he did)
 4.2 Responses to questions with syntactically high negation
There is another type of negation in questions, first identified by  Ladd 1981,  in
which negation occurs at a syntactically higher position, as in (56).
(56) A: Didn’t Ede steal some cookie? 
[ActP did-REQU [NegP not [ActP ASSERT [TP Ede tdid steal some cookie]]]]
↪dprop
The syntactic  analysis  (56) captures Ladd’s intuition that  the negation in such
questions is not propositional negation. It follows Krifka (to appear), who argues
that with such questions, a speaker requests the denegation of an assertion. In the
case at hand, the speaker asks the addressee to exclude the assertion that Ede stole
some cookies. This move can be performed, for example, when the speaker is in-
clined to believe that Ede stole some cookies, and wants to check whether the ad-
dressee would comply with this by eliminating any reason to assert the opposite.
What is important for our purpose is that negation is interpreted at the level of
speech acts, and not as propositional negation. Hence no propositional discourse
referent for the negated proposition is introduced. Hence such questions are simi-
lar to assertions, and we do not find any ambiguity for the answers yes and no:
4 Cf.  also Tian e.a.  (2010) concerning the  non-linguistic  accessibility of  situations in simple
negated sentences and in negated cleft sentences. 
14
Krifka
(57) B: a. Yes (he did). b. No (he didn’t).
c. *No, he did. d. *Yes, he didn’t.
 4.3 Polarity particles in German: the role of doch
In addition to yes and no there is a third particle in German, doch (cf. also French
si), that requires the presence of a negated propositional discourse referent5, as the
following examples illustrate, where (57b) contains a negation, nicht. 
(58) a. A: Ede hat den Keks gestohlen.  B: Ja. / Nein. / *Doch.
b. A: Ede hat den Keks nicht gestohlen.  B: Ja. / Nein. / Doch.
The negated discourse referent must be introduced with a sentential category. cf.
(59). And just like ja and nein, doch can also occur in embedded clauses, cf. (60).
(59) A: Es fehlt ein Keks. ‘A cookie is missing.’ B: Ja. / Nein. / *Doch.
(60) Ede hat den Keks wohl nicht gestohlen. Falls doch, wird er bestraft.
‘Ede probably did not steal the cookie. But if he did, he will be punished.’
As for the meaning of doch, I assume that doch presupposes that two proposi-
tional discourse referents are salient, one the negation of the other, and that doch
takes up the non-negated discourse referent and asserts it (cf. Karagjosova 2006,
who argues that doch contrastively focuses on a proposition p, requiring an alter-
native set {p, ¬p}). As argued for in (29), negated discourse referents can be iden-
tified due to a feature [neg].  Alternatively, we might say that  doch picks up the
negated discourse referent and negates it. But in this case nominal discourse refer-
ents that are introduced in the antecedent clause would not be accessible after
doch picks up that discourse referent, as negation limits the lifespan of discourse
referents. But in fact they are:
(61) Ede hat wohl k - einen Keks  gestohlen. Wenn doch, müssen wir ihn finden.
‘Ede may not have stolen a cookie. If DOCH, we have to find it.’
The specific presupposition of doch (expressed by a constraint PRES) creates a
competition with the particles yes and no. In particular, the use of the particle yes
for picking up the non-negated discourse referent is blocked by doch. This can be
expressed in OT tableaux in the fashion of Beaver 2004, who treats a similar situ-
ation, the blocking of taking up salient discourse referents by simpler expressions.
Following Beaver,  I assume a meta-constraint  BLOCK that is marked by the pres-
ence of an expression for which the indicated interpretation is strongly preferred.
(62) Optimal forms in an OT tableau; negated antecedent clause in German;
DISAGR is irrelevant if ordered under BLOCK.
5 This negated discourse referent can be accomodated in the “confirming” use of doch, as in Das
war nett von Ihnen. Doch, das muss man sagen ‘This was nice of you. DOCH one has to say
that’, where doch anticipates a negation of the first clause (cf. Karagjosova 2006).
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expression reference meaning *PRES BLOCK *NEGDR Favorite
a ja d′ ‘He did.’ *
b ja d ‘He didn’t.’ * (☜)
c nein d′ ‘He didn’t.’ ☜
d nein d ‘He did.’ * (☜)
e doch d′ ‘He did.’ ☜
f doch d ‘He didn’t.’ * *
This tableau predicts the right answer patterns.  The additional particle  doch cre-
ates a more expressive system, obviating the need to add an elliptical clause, as in
English, where this appears to be a Celtic feature, cf. Vennemann 2009.
 4.4 Narrow-scope negation and alternative questions
Let us look at  the following construction  concerning  negation in the scope of
quantifiers. Holmberg 2012 observes preference for the agreeing answer in (63):
(63) A: John sometimes / purposely did not show up for work.
B: Yes, he didn’t.  / ? No, he didn’t.
This can be explained as negation under the scope of a quantifier does not result
in a NegP, but in predicate negation, hence does not introduce a negated propDR. 
Predicate negation might also explain response systems like the one of Japa-
nese.  The response particles  hai and  iie are often explained as particles that ex-
press  agreement  vs.  disagreement.  Following  Yabushita  1998,  the  difference
rather is in the nature of negation, which he argues to be predicate negation in Ja-
panese. Hence only one discourse referent is introduced in negated clauses, and
the response particles  hai and iie, interpreted like  yes and no, lead to a non-am-
biguous interpretation even if the antecedent clause contained a negation. 
The  second  construction  are  alternative  questions.  They  are  typically  not
based on a questioned proposition, hence do not allow for yes/no answers at all: 
(64) A: Did Ede steal the cookie or the lollipop? 
B: *Yes. / *No. / The lollipop.
Answers yes and no are not possible in alternative questions with sentential alter-
natives as in (65). Here, propositional discourse referents are introduced, but in a
completely parallel fashion. Consequently, yes and no would be ambiguous, in a
way that cannot be recovered by pragmatic optimization. 
(65) A: [Is the door open], or [is it closed]? 
     ↪ dopen    ↪ dclosed
B: #No. / #Yes. / It is open.
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But as Farkas & Roelofsen (2012) observe,  the answer no is quite good in (66),
where the second alternative is the sentential negation of the first. 
(66) A: [Is the door [tdoor open] or [is the door [NegP not     [tdoor open]?
     ↪d1open        ↪d2′[neg]  ↪d2open 
B: (?)No. / (?)Yes.
The reason why yes and no are acceptable is that they would result in the same in-
formation when applied to either disjunct. In the first disjunct, only one proposi-
tional discourse referent is introduced, d1; in the second, there are two proposi-
tional discourse referents, where d2 is preferred over d2′. But notice that d1 and
d2 are anchored to the same proposition, and hence picking up either one by yes
or no would convey the same meaning. 
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